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Abstract
We provide a formally rigorous framework for integrating singular causa-
tion, as understood by Nuel Belnap’s theory of causae causantes, and objec-
tive single case probabilities. The central notion is that of a causal probability
space whose sample space consists of causal alternatives. Such a probability
space is generally not isomorphic to a product space. We give a causally mo-
tivated statement of the Markov condition and an analysis of the concept of
screening-off.
1 Causal dependencies and probabilities
Probability theory describes the likelihood of outcomes of chance set-ups. In this
paper, we will assume that the framework of probability theory applies to single,
concrete chance set-ups such as a single coin toss at a specific place and time.
This assumption appears to be uncontroversial in view of the fact that probability
theory is actually successfully applied. Since we are after a metaphysical picture
combining causation and probabilities, we will assume that both causal relations
and single case probabilities are objective. The aim of this paper may be described
as trying to make sense of that assumption by showing how it might be true.
Probability theory by itself has nothing to say about causation. However, ques-
tions of probabilities and questions of causation are obviously related. E.g., one
may ask whether probabilities can be a guide to discovering causal relations. The
literature on this question is large. When moved from an epistemic to a metaphys-
ical level, the question gets a different reading: What are the objective influences
of objectively existing causal relations on objectively existing probabilities? If a
concrete situation involves more than one chance set-up, the causal interrelation of
the set-ups may impose constraints on the probabilistic structure of the situation.
E.g., if depending on the outcome of one chance set-up, another one is enabled or
not, that causal structure should be mirrored in the probabilistic structure.
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In this paper, we will provide a rigorous framework for bringing together cau-
sation and probabilities. The paper is based on an existing theory of causation —
Nuel Belnap’s theory of causae causantes (Belnap, 2003b), the background for
which is branching space-times (Belnap, 1992). In this paper, we presuppose the
notation of Belnap (2003b), which should be consulted. A very readable intro-
duction to the problem of bringing together causation and probabilities is given in
Weiner and Belnap (2004), which should also be consulted. The present paper may
be read as a sequel to that paper, developing its ideas in more formal detail.1
1.1 Background: Causation in branching space-times
Branching space-times is a rigorous framework for combining relativistic space-
times with indeterminism. The basic building blocks of branching space-times are
a setW of concrete point events and a partial order≤ defined onW ; the companion
strict order is written “<”. Histories h are maximal directed sets, i.e., maximal such
that for any e1, e2 ∈ h there is e3 ∈ h with e1 < e3 and e2 < e3. Points e1, e2
that are incomparable (neither e1 ≤ e2 nor e2 < e1) can still be elements of the
same history, viz., if they have a common upper bound. In that case, we call e1
and e2 space-like related, and we write e1 SLR e2. — Branching occurs at single
indeterministic points. Thus, any two histories h1, h2 to which an indeterministic
point e belongs are either divided at e (h1 ⊥e h2) or undivided at e (h1 ≡e h2),
the latter being an equivalence relation. The set of histories containing e is written
H(e). H(e) is partitioned by ≡e; we write Πe for the set of partitions and Πe〈h〉 for
the unique element of Πe containing h (presupposing e ∈ h). Thus, Πe〈h〉 is the
set of histories containing e that are undivided from h at e. An initial I is a set of
point events that are part of one history. We write H[I] for the set of histories of
which I is a part; H[I] 6= ∅. It is often adequate to think of I as an upper bounded
initial chain, and I = {e} is an important special case. (A chain is a set of pairwise
comparable point events.) The primary propositional outcomes of an initial I are
the elements of the partition ΠI induced by undividedness at I , where h ≡I h′ iff
h ≡e h′ for all e ∈ I . An outcome event O is a set of (lower bounded) outcome
chains, all of which begin in one history. We write H〈O〉 for the set of histories in
which O begins to occur (even though it does not have to occur as a whole); by
definition, H〈O〉 6= ∅.
1Most of this paper was written while I was a guest of Nuel Belnap’s at the University of Pitts-
burgh. I thank him both for his hospitality and for many helpful discussions. Furthermore, I have
greatly benefitted from his numerous comments on previous versions of the paper, including the sug-
gestion to “try the contrapositive” on a previous proof of Lemma 2. I also thank Tomasz Placek for
many stimulating discussions and for specific comments. Nuel Belnap, Tomasz Placek and Matthew
Weiner have kindly shared their results prior to publication. Support by the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft is also gratefully acknowledged.
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Subscribing to the rather uncontroversial assumption that causation is a two-
place relation between cause and effect, the following two questions are crucial for
any theory of causation:
1. What is caused? Which entities are effects?
2. What causes? Which entities are causes?
As is well known, there are numerous different answers to these questions. One
main divide is between singular and generic causes and effects. Obviously, both
notions are important — consider “he broke the vase” vs. “smoking causes cancer”.
It seems both ontologically most promising and most in line with our framework
to address questions of singular causation first. Thus we look for singular, concrete
causes and effects. What sorts of entities are these? A good intuition seems to be
that causation involves change, but it is notoriously difficult to say what a change
is. The notion of a transition, introduced by von Wright (1963), is a liberalized
notion of change: A transition is “something and then something”; not necessarily
“. . . something else”. Following von Wright, in causation in branching space-times
the crucial causal notion is therefore that of a transition. Technically, a transition,
written I  O, is just an ordered pair of sets I and O of point events, where I is
an initial event and O is an outcome event located after I (i.e., for all eI ∈ I and
for all eO ∈ O we have eI < eO).
The answer to question (1) above, from the point of view of causation in
branching space-times, is accordingly:
1. Transitions are caused.
In sharp contrast to other theories of causation, causation in branching space-times
assumes that non-trivial causation depends on indeterminism. A transition I  O
whose outcome O is bound to occur, given that I occurs, has no causes. It does
not need any, since it happens anyway. Causes are thus understood as originating
causes (causae causantes), which seems to capture our actual usage of the category
of causation much more nicely than other accounts.
What are the causes? Causation in branching space-times gives the following
answer to question (2) above:
2. Causes are sets of (especially simple) transitions.
Thus, a transition is caused by (possibly a huge number of) transitions. The transi-
tions that figure as causes are of an especially simple sort: they are from a single
point e as initial (a past cause-like locus of the caused transition) to one of e’s pri-
mary outcomes Πe〈h〉. Given an outcome event O of e, e < O, the set of histories
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Πe〈O〉 is the uniquely determined member of the partition Πe ofH(e) in whichO is
kept possible, i.e., for which Πe〈O〉 ∩H〈O〉 6= ∅. In fact, we have H〈O〉 ⊆ Πe〈O〉.
The corresponding transitions, written ti = ei  Hi, Hi ∈ Πei , are called basic
transitions. It turns out, as it should, that basic transitions are their own causes.
Thus, they may figure as irreducibly indeterministic building blocks of our inde-
terministic world. In the theory that will be developed in this paper, they will also
form the building blocks for the construction of probability spaces, thus providing
a close link between causation and probabilities.
Having mentioned the concepts, we now give the formal definitions of “past
cause-like locus” and “causa causans” (cf. Belnap 2003b) for later reference.
Definition 1 (Past cause-like loci) Let I  O be a transition. Then the set of
past cause-like loci for that transition, pcl(I  O), is defined to be
pcl(I  O) := {e ∈W | e < O ∧ ∃h ∈ H[I] h ⊥e H〈O〉}.
Thus, a point event e is a past cause-like locus for I  O if (i) e < O, i.e., e
is a lower bound for the outcome O, and (ii) there is a history h in which the ini-
tial I finishes that is separated at e from all histories in which O begins to occur.
Past cause-like loci make a difference as to the occurrence of O. They are there-
fore necessarily indeterministic points, i.e., points with more than one immediate
outcome.
Definition 2 (Causae causantes) Let I  O be a transition. Then the set of
causae causantes for that transition, cc(I  O), is defined to be
cc(I  O) := {e Πe〈O〉 | e ∈ pcl(I  O)}.
A causa causans for a transition I  O is thus a transition from a past cause-like
locus e to that unique immediate outcome Πe〈O〉 of e that keeps O possible right
after e.
1.2 What are probabilities defined for?
Intuitively, probabilities are probabilities of outcomes of chance set-ups. Causation
in branching space-times offers the notion of an indeterministic transition to stand
for “chance set-up”. If I  O can occur, but O does not have to occur given I ,
then it will in many cases be sensible to ask how probable the transition I  O was
compared to the alternatives. Thus, probabilities are probabilities of transitions. (In
the causally trivial case of a deterministic transition, the probability will be trivially
equal to one.) We will bind the notion of probabilities fully to the notion of causae
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causantes: Since the framework has room for indeterminism, it should be possible
to grade that indeterminism numerically at least in some cases.2
We will reduce all considerations of probabilities of transitions to considera-
tions of probabilities of combinations of basic transitions. This will be done by in
some way identifying a transition with its set of causae causantes. We call two
transitions causally equivalent (I  O c≡ I ′ O′) iff they have the same causae
causantes:
Definition 3 (Causal equivalence of transitions)
I  O c≡ I ′ O′ iff cc(I  O) = cc(I ′ O′).
The relation c≡ is an equivalence relation, and an equivalence class may be speci-
fied via the set of causae causantes of one of its members. In what follows, we will
therefore not talk about transitions in general, but about sets of basic transitions.3
The main work that is to be done is to find out how basic transitions combine and
which probabilities should be assigned to such combinations.
Thus, the next section introduces some facts about basic transitions, and the
section after that is concerned with probabilities.
2 Basic transitions
2.1 Basics of basic transitions
Basic transitions are transitions from a point event (initial) ei to one of ei’s imme-
diate outcomes Hi ∈ Πei ; we write
ti = ei Hi.
The different Hi ∈ Π(ei) partition H(ei), the set of all histories containing ei.
Points ei for which Π(ei) has only one member are called trivial; at such points,
no splitting occurs. A transition ei  H(ei) with a trivial initial is also called
trivial. We will mostly be interested in non-trivial, or indeterministic, points and
2It seems to be rather uncontroversial that probabilities are numerically graded modalities; cf.
e.g., Popper (1982, 70) and van Fraassen (1980, 198). Once possibilities are there, probabilities are
(well, almost) for free.
3This does not mean that all that is important about a transition is its set of causae causantes.
E.g., epistemically the spatiotemporal location of I and O may play a huge role, and there are also
important differences between a basic transition and a non-basic transition that is causally equivalent
to it. All we claim in this paper is that on the ontological level, all that is probabilistically important
about a transition is in its causae causantes, taken together.
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transitions. A cause-like locus is always indeterministic by definition, so sets of
causae causantes consist of non-trivial basic transitions.
We call two basic transitions t1 = e1  H1 and t2 = e2  H2 initial-
equivalent if their initials are the same (e1 = e2); in this case, we write t1 i≡ t2.
This is an equivalence relation, and the equivalence class of ti, [ti], is the set of all
basic transitions with initial ei. Since [ti] is completely specified by the initial ei,
we also write the equivalence classes as [ei]:4
[ti] = [ei] = {ei H | H ∈ Πei}.
We call an initial ei finitely splitting iff [ei] is finite. — On the set of basic transi-
tions, we can define a partial ordering relation as follows:
ti < tj iff ei < ej and H(ej) ⊆ Hi.5
Thus, the transition tj is above ti (ti < tj) if tj can occur in the outcome Hi of ti.
For this it is not enough that ei < ej : Since at ei, histories split, ej must also occur
in the outcome Hi of ei.
The ordering of transitions sheds some light on when two transitions are com-
patible. This will now be spelled out in terms of consistent sets of transitions.
2.2 Set of basic transitions
Sets of basic transitions will be the basic building blocks for the probability spaces
to be defined later on: they will constitute the elements of the sample space. Not
all sets of basic transitions will do, however. Some sets are such that they cannot
occur in one history — they are causally impossible. The most useful sets of ba-
sic transitions are the consistent ones, where consistency is something like causal
possibility.
2.2.1 Consistency of sets of basic transitions
The notion of consistency is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (Consistent set of basic transitions) A set T = {t1, t2, . . .} of basic
transitions (ti = ei  Hi) is consistent iff all the outcomes have a history in
4This notion of initial-equivalence of basic transitions is to be distinguished from the notion of
causal equivalence of transitions employed above. Note also that on [ti], probabilities can be easily
defined, since we can introduce a natural set-theoretic Boolean algebra structure on Πei . This will
be our starting point later on.
5Note that given ei < ej , if H(ej) ∩Hi 6= ∅, then H(ej) ⊆ Hi by transitivity of ≡ei .
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common, i.e., iff ∩ti∈THi 6= ∅. (The empty set ∅ is considered consistent, since the
intersection of an empty set of histories, ∩ti∈∅Hi, is by definition taken to be the
set H of all histories.)
By this definition, any subset of a consistent set of basic transitions is consistent.
A good thing to note is that the set of basic transitions that we identified with a
general transition I  O is consistent in the sense just defined.
Lemma 1 For any transition I  O, the set of its causae causantes is consistent.
Proof: Let I  O be given, and let T = cc(I  O). By definition, any ei 
Hi = ti ∈ T satisfies ei < O and Hi = Π(ei)〈O〉, so that H〈O〉 ⊆ Hi. Thus,
H〈O〉 ⊆ ∩ti∈THi. As H〈O〉 6= ∅, T is consistent. 
Before we can move on, we need to state, and assume, an important postulate and
a convenient limitation.
2.2.2 Limitations: Finiteness and exclusion of modal funny business
The theory to be developed here will be limited in two ways. The first limitation
is for convenience’s sake and will have to be removed in a further development of
the theory: We will assume that all sets of causae causantes and all probability
structures that we are going to deal with are finite. This is by no means a “natural”
limitation, i.e., we do not assume that there are any deep ontological reasons for
this limitation. It is just that sticking to the finite case will allow us to focus on
the problem of combining causality and probability without having to cope with
problems of infinite probability structures all along.6
The second limitation is fundamental. In the general theory of branching space-
times, there may occur a phenomenon that Nuel Belnap has aptly called “modal
funny business”: roughly, some combinatorially possible histories may be absent.
Since we rely on smooth combinatorics, we will have to exclude models involving
modal funny business from our considerations. This seems not to be much of a
constraint, however, since a modally “funny” model may be mimicked probabilis-
tically by a model in which the combinatorics are smooth, and formerly missing
histories are excluded via probability zero.
Belnap (2003a) proves the equivalence of four different notions of modal funny
business. For our purposes, it is best to use the following notion:
Definition 5 (Modal funny business) In a model of branching space-times, there
is primary space-like related modal funny business iff there are two initial events
6Cf. note 8 below for some comments on infinite structures.
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Figure 1: Effects of modal funny business.
(nonempty sets of point events that are part of one history) I1, I2 such that I1 SLR I2
(∀e1 ∈ I1 ∀e2 ∈ I2 e1 SLR e2), but one primary outcome ΠI1〈h1〉 of I1 has an
empty intersection with one primary outcome ΠI2〈h2〉 of I2.7
Figure 1 illustrates what may happen if there is modal funny business. The three
depicted histories are all the histories there are in the model. Consider first the
events ea, eb, and ec that occur in all three histories. Each of these is an indeter-
ministic point event with two outcomes, which are labeled ‘+’ and ‘−’. There is
modal funny business according to Definition 5 — e.g., for I1 = {ea}, I2 = {eb},
the intersection of the ‘−’ outcomes is empty; among the three histories, none con-
tains both ea − and eb −. In the depicted case, there are also three pairwise
space-like related points e1, e2, and e3 which are nonetheless not all contained in
one single history: Each pair, e.g., e1, e2, is incomparable, and there is a history,
e.g., h1, containing both points, witnessing the space-like relatedness. But con-
trary to what one might assume, none of the three histories of the model contains
all three points e1, e2, and e3. In the absence of modal funny business, such a sit-
uation is ruled out: Given no modal funny business according to Definition 5, for
any finite set of pairwise SLR points there is a history containing the whole set, and
any set of transitions with pairwise SLR initials has a nonempty common outcome.
Lemma 2 If there is no modal funny business according to Definition 5, the fol-
lowing holds: (a) Let E = {e1, . . . , en} be such that for ei, ej ∈ E, if ei 6= ej ,
then ei SLR ej . Then H[E] 6= ∅, i.e., there is a history containing all the points in
E. (b) Furthermore, let T = {t1, . . . , tn} be a set of transitions (ti = ei  Hi)
such that the set of initials E = {ei | ti ∈ T} fulfills the conditions of (a) and such
that no two transitions from T have the same initial. Then T is consistent, i.e., the
transitions in T have a common outcome: ∩ti∈THi 6= ∅.
7In the infinite case, this definition will have to be altered; cf. note 8 below for some indications
of what needs to be changed.
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Proof: We prove only (b), from which one may obtain (a) as follows: if only E is
given, select arbitrary outcomes Hi ∈ Πei for each ei ∈ E. If then ∩ti∈THi 6= ∅,
we have H[E] 6= ∅ since Hi ⊆ H(ei). — So assume that the premises of (b) hold,
but that ∩ti∈THi = ∅. Let T ′ ⊂ T be a subset of T that is maximal with respect
to ∩ti∈T ′Hi 6= ∅. Now let tj ∈ T − T ′. Set E′ = {ei | ti ∈ T ′}. By assumption,
the elements of E are pairwise SLR, so the sets I1 = E′, I2 = {ej} are initials,
and the sets ∩ti∈T ′Hi and Hj are primary outcomes, fulfilling the requirement of
Definition 5. Now since there is no modal funny business by assumption, that
Definition implies ∩ti∈T ′Hi ∩Hj 6= ∅, contradicting the maximality of T ′. 
In what follows, we will assume that there is no modal funny business:
Postulate 1 (No modal funny business) There is no modal funny business accord-
ing to Definition 5.
2.2.3 Characterization of consistency in the absence of modal funny business
Given finite structures and no modal funny business, the notion of consistency of a
set of basic transitions can be expressed in different ways:
Lemma 3 Let T = {t1, . . . , tn}, ti = ei  Hi. The following conditions are
equivalent:
1. T is consistent.
2. There is a history to which all the ei belong (∩ti∈TH(ei) 6= ∅). Furthermore,
(a) if ei = ej , then Hi = Hj , and (b) if ei < ej , then H(ej) ⊆ Hi.
3. For any ti, tj ∈ T , exactly one of the following holds:
(a) ei = ej and Hi = Hj (i.e., ti = tj) or
(b) ti < tj or
(c) tj < ti or
(d) ei SLR ej .
Proof: 1⇒ 2: For all ti, Hi ⊂ H(ei), and ∩ti∈THi 6= ∅ by (1). So there is a history
to which all the ei belong. If ei = ej , then Hi ∩Hj 6= ∅ iff Hi = Hj (the family
of outcomes of ei is a partition of H(ei)). If ei < ej , then H(ej) ∩Hi = ∅ would
imply Hj ∩Hi = ∅ (since Hj ⊆ H(ej)), meaning that T would be inconsistent.
2 ⇒ 3: Assume T violates (3), i.e., there are ti, tj ∈ T such that none of
(3a)–(3d) applies. This is possible in four ways: (a) ei = ej , but Hi 6= Hj — this
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violates (2); (b) ei < ej , but H(ej) ∩Hi = ∅ — again violating (2); (c) for ej < ei
symmetrical to (b); (d) ei 6< ej and ej 6≤ ei and not ei SLR ej — this means that
there is no history to which both ei and ej belong, again violating (2).
3 ⇒ 1: Let T ′ := {ti ∈ T | ¬∃tj ∈ T ti < tj} be the set of maximal
elements of T . It will be sufficient to establish that ∩ti∈T ′Hi 6= ∅, since if ti < tj ,
Hj ⊆ Hi. Now for ti, tj ∈ T ′, if ti 6= tj , then we have ei SLR ej : ei = ej is
ruled out by (3a), and ti < tj or tj < ti is impossible since T ′ is the set of the
maximal elements. Thus we have a set of pairwise space-like related points with
outcomes Hi specified, and by Lemma 2 (b), there is a history in the intersection
of all outcomes. 
The following Lemma characterizes the special status of the maximal elements:
their outcomes may be changed at will without violating consistency.
Lemma 4 If T = {t1, . . . , tn} is consistent and t0 ∈ [ti], t0 6= ti, then T ′ =
(T − {ti}) ∪ {t0} is consistent iff ti is maximal in T .
Proof: “⇐”: If ti is maximal, then the set with t0 substituted is also consistent by
Lemma 3 (2).
“⇒”: Let ti not be maximal in T , i.e., there is tj ∈ T s.t. ti < tj , i.e., ei < ej
and H(ej)∩Hi 6= ∅. Since Πei is a partition of H(ei), H(ej)∩H0 = ∅. By Lemma 3
(2), the set with t0 substituted is thus inconsistent. 
3 Causal probability theory
We have now prepared the ground for the introduction of probabilities into the
framework of causation in branching space-times. By the close link between cau-
sation and probability that was assumed at the outset, the objects that figure as
causes — sets of basic transitions — will be the objects on which probabilities will
be defined. In order to have probabilities, we need probability spaces:
Definition 6 (Probability space) A probability space is a triple 〈A,F, µ〉, where
A is a nonempty set (the “sample space”), F is a Boolean σ-algebra (sometimes
called “event algebra”) of subsets of A (with zero element 0 = ∅ and unit element
1 = A), and µ is a normalized, countably additive measure on F , i.e., (i) µ(1) = 1
and (ii) if (fi)i∈I is an at most countable family of disjoint elements of F , then
µ(∪i∈Ifi) =
∑
i∈I µ(fi).
As stated above, we will consider finite probability structures exclusively. Thus, we
will assume in the following that all probability spaces that we deal with are finite.
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In a finite probability space, F is just the usual set-theoretic algebra of subsets of
A, with the elements of A playing the role of atoms, or basic alternatives.
The basic questions of this section may be characterized as follows:
Given a transition I  O, represented by a consistent set T of basic transitions:
In which probability space can we speak of a “probability for T”? That is:
1. What is the sample space A that contains T and its causal alternatives?
2. What is the Boolean σ-algebra F ?
3. What is the measure µ; which general constraints hold for µ?
4. How do the measures in different probability spaces relate?
We will motivate our answers to these questions through a number of increasingly
complex examples.
3.1 Examples for T
The simplest example is given by a trivial transition: its set of causae causantes is
empty. In this case, we have A = {∅}, F consists of two elements only (A and the
empty set), and µ(A) = 1. The first non-trivial example is given by a singleton set
of transitions.
3.1.1 T = {t1}
In this case, t1 is a basic transition with initial e1 and outcome H1 ∈ Π(e1). The
probability space that needs to be considered is obvious:. The sample space is nat-
urally taken to be [t1], i.e., the set of all basic transitions with initial e1. Our finite-
ness assumption requires that [t1] be finite. This is not guaranteed, and it is cer-
tainly not adequate in all situations, but there exist well-known measure-theoretic
ways of dealing with infinities in this case (cf. note 8 below).
Given finite A = [t1], F is just the set of all subsets of A. The measure µ is
uniquely characterized by its value on the singleton sets, since any member of F is
the disjoint union of a finite number of singletons. This is all standard probability
theory, with no hint of causal constraints.
3.1.2 T = {t1, t2}, e1 SLR e2
The simplest case of a set T with two elements is the case in which the initials
are space-like separated. (We do not consider the case that T is inconsistent at the
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moment, since that cannot happen for T derived from a given transition I  O,
cf. Lemma 1.)
In the present case, T combines two transitions. For single transitions, we
already know how to construct probability spaces — simply take the set [ti] to
be the sample space, as outlined above. From the two probability spaces P1 =
〈A1, F1, µ1〉 and P2 = 〈A2, F2, µ2〉 we may then form the product space, P =
〈A,F, µ〉, where A = A1 × A2 is the Cartesian product of A1 and A2, i.e., the
set of ordered pairs 〈a1, a2〉 with ai ∈ Ai, i = 1, 2, and F = F1 × F2 is the
respective product Boolean algebra. For the measure µ, we at least require the
so-called marginal property:
Definition 7 (Marginal property for pairs) A measure µ on the product Boolean
algebra F = F1×F2 has the marginal property iff (i) for all f1 ∈ F1, µ(〈f1, 12〉) =
µ1(f1) and (ii) for all f2 ∈ F2, µ(〈11, f2〉) = µ2(f2).
The marginal property means that if one ignores the outcome of one initial by
considering the certain outcome 1i = Ai (for which µi(1i) = 1), one gets back the
single probability. Requiring that µ satisfy the marginal property does not fix µ —
there are many ways open. One specific way is taking the product measure µ×:
µ×(〈f1, f2〉) = µ1(f1) · µ2(f2).
The other way is to allow for correlations between outcomes of e1 and e2 by using
a different measure.
Here comes a crucial question: Given that e1 and e2 are space-like related (and
thus, causally separated), should we require that µ = µ×? We believe that no,
since quantum-mechanical correlation experiments give strong evidence that there
can be correlations between outcomes of space-like separated events. In order to
remain flexible, our theory should allow both for correlations and for the product
measure.
The product construction described above is standard in probability theory. A dif-
ferent perspective on that construction will prove to be illuminating when it comes
to generalizations. By Lemma 2, any combination of one outcome of e1 and one
outcome of e2 is consistent: Each {t′1, t′2} with t′1 ∈ [t1], t′2 ∈ [t2], is consistent.
We may base our probability space on such sets and define:
A = {{t′1, t′2} | t′1 ∈ [t1], t′2 ∈ [t2]}.
By the assumption of finitude, F may again be the usual set algebra, and it will
suffice to define the measure µ on the atoms, i.e., on the elements of A. Since
in this construction, we did not start with “single” probability spaces P1 and P2,
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we cannot state the marginal property as before. However, we may require some
form of marginal property once two “single” probability spaces with respective
measures µ1 and µ2 are given in addition:
Definition 8 (Marginal property for sets) Let F be the Boolean algebra of sets
of transitions as defined above. A measure µ on F has the marginal property iff (i)
for all a1 ∈ A1, µ({{a1, a2} | a2 ∈ A2}) = µ1({a1}) and (ii) for all a2 ∈ A2,
µ({{a1, a2} | a1 ∈ A1}) = µ2({a2}).
This is quite similar to Definition 7: Since
µ({{a1, a2} | a2 ∈ A2}) =
∑
a2∈A2
µ({{a1, a2}}),
requiring that that sum be equal to µ1({a1}) again means that by ignoring the out-
come of e2 (by summing over all possibilities), one gets back the “single” measure.
In the present case (e1 SLR e2), the two mentioned perspectives are provably
equivalent, since there is an isomorphism between the two mentioned probability
spaces, via
〈a1, a2〉 ↔ {a1, a2}.
The important question is which of the two perspectives generalizes. In classical
probability theory, combinations of chance set-ups are adequately described via
product constructions. It turns out, however, that once causal notions enter the
picture, product constructions are no longer adequate. This is shown by the next
example.
3.1.3 T = {t1, t2}, t1 < t2
Apart from the case e1 SLR e2, which has already been considered, and the case
t2 < t1, which is symmetrical to the present one, this is the only possible case
of a consistent set of two transitions (cf. Lemma 3 (3)). As in the previous case,
two chance set-ups are combined. The attempt to apply a product construction will
result in an instructive failure.
As in the case for e1 SLR e2, one may try to start from two probability spaces
〈Ai, Fi, µi〉 with Ai = [ti], i = 1, 2. The product space 〈A,F, µ〉 is definable
as before. However, that probability space is not adequate for the causal situation
assumed. Consider a pair 〈t′1, t′2〉 with t1 ∈ [t1], t′1 6= t1, t′2 ∈ [t2]. That pair
corresponds to a causally impossible “alternative” to T , since by Lemma 4, there
is no history in which both the outcome H ′1 of t′1 and the initial e2 of t′2 occur
together. The only reasonable thing to do probabilistically seems to be to require
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that µ(〈t′1, t′2〉) = 0 in that case (i.e., in case t′1 6= t1). But then, given the marginal
property, we get
µ1(t′1) = µ(〈t′1, 12〉) =
∑
t′2∈[t2]
µ(〈t′1, t′2〉) = 0 for t′1 6= t1,
and by normalization of µ1, we get µ1(t1) = 1: e1 is bound to have outcome H1.
That is certainly not warranted.
Consider a real life example: Assume that at e1 you decide at random whether
to go to the races or not (possibly by flipping a fair coin); [e1] = {e1  H11 , e1 
H21}, µ(go) = µ1(e1  H11 ) = 0.5. If you are at the races (e2 such that e1 < e2
and H(e2) ⊆ H11 ), you either win (e2  H12 ) or you lose (e2  H22 ); suppose
µ2(win) = µ2(e2  H12 ) = 0.2. The product space contains the four atoms
〈go,win〉, 〈go, lose〉, 〈stay,win〉, and 〈stay, lose〉.
The latter two are causally impossible: If you do not go to the races, you can neither
win nor lose. By the argument given above, it seems to follow that therefore, you
go with probability 1. This is absurd.
A way out of this quandary is to use the alternative to the product space con-
struction that was introduced above: Consider only the consistent combinations of
outcomes of e1 and e2 and take as the atoms the maximally consistent sets. Thus,
we take the sample space of alternatives to be
A = {{t1, t′2} | t′2 ∈ [t2]} ∪ {{t′1} | t′1 ∈ [t1], t′1 6= t1}.
Given finiteness, the Boolean algebra F is again the usual set-theoretic algebra, and
µ is uniquely specified by its value on the atoms. Each element of A is a maximally
detailed description of a consistent outcome involving the initials e1 and (possibly)
e2, and each element of F is a set of such consistent outcomes. A then contains
exactly the causal alternatives to T . In terms of the races example, we consider
as atomic outcomes only the three (instead of four) maximally consistent sets (not
pairs) of transitions,
{go,win}, {go, lose}, {stay}.
Note that while the set {go} is consistent, it is not maximally so and is thus not
considered to be an atomic possibility. We may however identify that set with an
element of F : {go} says the same as {{go,win}, {go, lose}} — if you go, you
either go and win, or you go and lose. A kind of marginal property is thus already
built into our framework, since the probability of {go} evaluates as
µ({go}) = µ({{go,win}, {go, lose}}) = µ({{go,win}}) + µ({{go, lose}})
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by probability theory alone. We will spell this out by defining the notion of a
representative below.
The framework sketched for our example easily generalizes to arbitrary finite
causal probability structures, as will be shown in the following.
3.2 General causal probabilities
We start with a given consistent set T of transitions, e.g., the set of causae cau-
santes of a given transition I  O. Since we only consider finite structures in this
paper, we require that (i) T be finite and that (ii) for each ti ∈ T , [ti] be finite.8
The causal probability space PT = 〈AT , FT , µT 〉 that is adequate to describe
causal alternatives to T is constructed as follows:
1. Let T˜ = ∪ti∈T [ti], the set of all alternatives to the elements of T .
2. Let AT = {T ′ | T ′ ⊆ T˜ , T ′ maximally consistent}.
3. Let FT be the set-theoretic Boolean algebra over AT .
4. The measure µT may be any normalized measure on FT .
5. The sought-for probability space is PT = 〈AT , FT , µT 〉.
As one expects, the set T of transitions turns out to be an element of AT since T is
consistent and by Lemma 3 (3a), no other element of T˜ can be consistently added
to T . The given construction does not in any way single out T from among the
other elements of AT . This is as it should be, since a probability space does not
contain a designated element to stand for “the real outcome”. Thus, the probability
space PT can be constructed once the initials of all transitions in T are known: it
suffices to start from a given consistent set of point events E; the corresponding
8It turns out that while it is rather simple to generalize with respect to requirement (ii), using
standard tools of measure theory (e.g., Borel sets), it is much harder to generalize with respect to
(i). In fact, infinite T creates difficulties for both considerations of probabilities and for the notion
of “modal funny business”. With respect to the latter, it turns out that Definition 5 is no longer
adequate for guaranteeing “smooth combinatorics”. In order to exclude combinatorially weird cases,
it seems best to use the step from condition (3) to condition (1) in Lemma 3 as the mark of “no funny
business”. The whole area merits further study. — With respect to probabilities, if T is infinite, i.e.,
involves infinitely many initials, then there may be an infinite SLR set of initials, and there may be
an infinite chain of transitions in T . In the first case, the tools of standard probability theory for
infinite product spaces (cylinder sets, zero-one laws) will apply. In the second case, the situation
appears to be more challenging. Still that case is very interesting in view of the fact that, e.g., in
the modal theory of agency, “busy choice sequences” are analyzed whose probabilistic equivalent
exactly requires a probability theory for infinite chains of transitions. That question, too, certainly
merits further study.
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probability space may then be denoted PE = 〈AE , FE , µE〉. Since this way of
specifying causal probability structures can be generalized most easily, we will
mainly be talking about probability space PE with a given set E of initials. — It
is even possible to build probability spaces from given inconsistent sets of point
events; we will consider this generalization below.
In standard probability theory, it is customary to require that different measures in
different probability spaces respect the marginal property, which was formulated
for pairs as Definition 7 above. Since causal probability structures are not product
spaces, we need some way of expressing the fact that we wish to consider the
probability of “the same thing” in different probability spaces.
3.2.1 Representation in different probability spaces
Reconsider the races example from section 3.1.3. Going was in some sense an
alternative, but it was not a maximally specific alternative and thus, not an element
of AT . Still there was a place for it in FT , viz., as the set {{go,win}, {go, lose}}.
More generally, we may ask: Given a consistent set of basic transitions S, i.e., an
element of the sample space AE of some causal probability space PE , and a causal
probability space PE′ , how is S represented in PE′? That question may be split in
two: (i) When is S representable in PE′? (ii) In case S is representable, what is the
representative? The answer to the first question is straightforward:
Definition 9 (Representability of S in PE′) A consistent set S ∈ AE of basic
transitions is representable in PE′ iff E ⊆ E′.
When S is representable, we have seen that we should not expect S ∈ AE′ , since
AE′ contains maximally consistent sets relative to E′ only, and S may not be max-
imal. Nor will we have S ∈ FE′ , since FE′ is a set of (maximally consistent) sets
of transitions. However, the following definition captures the required notion:
Definition 10 (Representative of S in PE′) The representative of S in PE′ , SE′ ,
is defined to be the set of all maximally consistent sets extending S:
SE′ = {T ′ ∈ AE′ | S ⊆ T ′}.
Thus we have SE′ ∈ FE′ . In order to visualize what is going on, it may be good to
divide the definition into two steps, one downward and one upward, as follows:
1. S′ = S ∪ {e′ Πe′〈e〉 | e H minimal in S, e′ < e, e′ ∈ E′}
In words: S′ is derived from S by “downward closure in E′”, i.e., by adding
all transitions below S that are consistent with S and that have initials in E′.
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2. SE′ = {T ′ ∈ AE′ | S′ ⊆ T ′}
In words: the representative of S in PE′ is the set of all maximally consistent
sets extending S′. Since S′ is downward closed in E′, this step will only add
elements on top of S.
The concept of a representative allows us to state, and prove, that the probability of
a set of transitions is always smaller than or equal to the probability of its subsets:
Lemma 5 Let S be representable in PE′ , and let S′ ⊆ S. Then µE′(SE′) ≤
µE′(S′E′).
Proof: As S′ ⊆ S, S′ is representable in PE′ as well. From the definition of SE′ ,
one reads off SE′ ⊆ S′E′ . The claim then follows from the additivity of µE′ . 
Representing elements of the event algebra So far, we have only considered the
representation of consistent sets of transitions, i.e., elements of the sample space
of some probability space. More generally, we may be interested in defining a
representative for a set of consistent sets of transitions, e.g., an element of the
event algebra of some probability space. The respective definitions are natural
generalizations of the two definitions from above:
Definition 11 (Representability) A set f ∈ FE of sets of basic transitions is rep-
resentable in PE′ iff E ⊆ E′.
Thus, f is representable in PE′ iff each S ∈ f is representable in PE′ .
Definition 12 (Representative of f in PE′) The representative of f in PE′ , fE′ ,
is defined to be the set of all representatives of elements of f :
fE′ = {SE′ | S ∈ f}.
3.2.2 Adapting the marginal property
As in standard probability theory, we want to say that the probability of “some-
thing” is the same in all probability spaces representing the something. Taking the
“something” to be a consistent set of basic transitions, one might think that we
would like to have the following alternative marginal property:
(BAD-MP) If S ∈ AE is representable in PE′ , then µE(S) = µE′(SE′).
In standard probability theory, this is a good way to describe the marginal property.
In our framework, it will not do. Consider S = {e1  H1} and E = {e1}, E′ =
{e0, e1} with e0 < e1. In this situation, the probability of S = {{e1  H1}} will
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normally be greater than the probability of SE′ = {{e0  Πe0〈e1〉, e1  H1}},
since in PE′ , first e0 has to have the right outcome and then e1 has to have the
right outcome, whereas in PE , only e1 has to have the right outcome. Standard
probability theory with the product construction does not leave room for picturing
more than one “layer” of initials, but the framework that is presented here does. In
order to arrive at a correct formulation of the marginal property, we need to require
that PE′ be an extension of PE , which notion is defined as follows:
Definition 13 (Extension) A causal probability space PE′ is an extension of PE
iff (i) E ⊆ E′ and (ii) there is no e′ ∈ E′ − E and e ∈ E such that e′ < e.
In other words, PE′ is an extension of PE iff E′ is a superset of E and all the new
elements of E′ are maximal with respect to E. If PE′ extends PE , the problematic
situation described above cannot occur. Thus, the following is an adequate formu-
lation of the marginal property for sets of basic transitions in our causal framework:
(MP) If S ∈ AE is representable in PE′ and if PE′ extends PE , then µE(S) =
µE′(SE′).
We postulate that the marginal property should hold in Our world:
Postulate 2 The marginal property (MP) holds for all probability assignments.
Postulate 2 is already sufficient to ensure that an analogue of (MP) holds for ele-
ments of event algebras as well. We state this result as a Lemma:
Lemma 6 Let f ∈ FE , and let PE′ extend PE . Given (MP), it follows that
µE(f) = µE′(fE′).
Proof:
µE(f) =
∑
S∈f
µE(S) =
∑
S∈f
µE′(SE′) = µE′({SE′ | S ∈ f}) = µE′(fE′).

3.2.3 Markov property
The motivation for the marginal property was purely structural: “the same thing”
has to have the same probability, however represented. The causal structure only
entered in spelling out what “representing the same thing” might mean. We now
consider a property of probability spaces that is of causal origin and that accord-
ingly does not have a direct counterpart in standard probability theory. We rely on
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the intuition that the probability of a transition is something like the probability of
the outcome, given the initial. We will suggest that in some specific cases, this may
be read as a conditional probability.
We first introduce the notion of layering:
Definition 14 Let T be consistent. We say that T is layered iff there is a proper
subset T ′ of T such that for all t′ ∈ T ′ and for all t ∈ T − T ′, t < t′. In this case,
we say that T ′ forms an upper layer of T .
e
ee 1 2
3
A
e 3
ee 1 2
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e
e
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2
1
C
Figure 2: A: not layered; B and C: layered
Not all T are layered; consider Figure 2A, where e2 < e3, but e1 SLR e2 and
e1 SLR e3. If T is layered, as in Figure 2B and C, an upper layer may be uniquely
determined, as in (B), or it may not be unique, as in (C).
Transitions in an upper layer of layered T all are located above all the other
transitions. Thus there can be no causal influence from the transitions in T − T ′
on one of the outcomes of T ′ that was not already present when T ′ occurs. Given
that T ′ occurs, the occurrence of T − T ′ has been accounted for completely. This
observation motivates the following postulate:
Postulate 3 (Markov property) Let T = R ∪ S be consistent and layered, and
let R be an upper layer of T . Then all measures µT on PT satisfy
µT (T ) = µR(R) · µS(S).
In case µS(S) 6= 0, this may be phrased in terms of conditional probabilities:
µR(R) = µT (T | S) = µT ({T} ∩ ST )/µT (ST ) = µT (T )/µS(S),
where we have employed T ∈ ST (since S ⊆ T ) and µS(S) = µT (ST ) (by the
marginal property).
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Note that we are here dealing with an ontologically motivated Markov condi-
tion that applies to single cases. In connection with graphical models and Bayesian
Networks, one assumes a so-called “causal Markov condition” that applies to “vari-
ables”. We will give some brief remarks on the interrelation between the frame-
work presented here and the framework of Bayesian Networks at the end of sec-
tion 3.2.6 below.
3.2.4 Causal probability spaces from inconsistent initials
Technically, it is unproblematic to extend the probability space construction de-
scribed at the beginning of section 3.2 to any set E of initials:
• Form the set T˜ = ∪e∈E [e].
• Use the set of all maximally consistent subsets of T˜ as sample space AE .
• Form the event algebra FE ; in the finite case that is assumed here for sim-
plicity, use the set-theoretic algebra of subsets of AE .
• Define some suitable measure µE on FE .
• Set the probability space PE to be 〈AE , FE , µE〉.
For this construction to be well-defined it is not necessary that E be consistent.
E.g., in the case of E = {e1, e2} with incompatible e1 and e2, assuming two
outcomes +1,−1 and +2,−2 for simplicity, AE contains only singletons:
AE = {{e1  +1}, {e1  −1}, {e2  +2}, {e2  −2}}.
The crucial question is: under which circumstances can we give a coherent causal
reading to the space PE? The guiding idea in constructing probability spaces was
that AE should describe alternatives. In the example, this reading appears ques-
tionable: in which sense might the occurrence of e1  +1 be an alternative to
the occurrence of e2  +2? A minimal sense of “alternative” might be defended:
They cannot both occur, so they are alternatives. But by looking for a causal read-
ing of probability spaces, we also want a causal sense of “alternative”, and that
sense is not forthcoming in the example: No connection between the alternatives
is present. Things would be different if E contained a third element e such that
e < e1, e < e2, for then, e would provide the sought-for causal link, shared by all
alternatives.
In the general case, we want to say thatAE is a set of causal alternatives if there
is such a causal link in the form of initials that are shared by all the alternatives.
Since AE consists of maximally consistent sets of transitions, the minima of E will
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be common initials of all alternatives in AE exactly if they are consistent. We thus
give the following definition of when a probability space is causally interpretable
as a space of alternatives:9
Definition 15 (Causal probability space) Let E be a finite set of finitely splitting
point events. The probability space PE , defined as above, is a causal probability
space iff the minimal elements of E are consistent.
Given a causal probability space PE , it will do no harm to add proper maxima
to E — the resulting probability space will again be causal, since its minimal
elements stay the same. We call the procedure of adding proper maxima “fine
graining”. For the idea, refer back to the races example from section 3.1.3. There,
E = {e1, e2}, and there was one minimal initial, e1 (deciding what to do), with
outcomes go/stay. In the outcome “go”, there was a second initial, e2 (betting), with
outcomes win/lose. By our definition, the corresponding probability space PE is
causal. That feature will be preserved if we give a more fine-grained description
of the “stay” outcome of e1 by adding a new initial e3 in the “stay” outcome above
e1. E.g., e3 might have outcomes read/cook. With E′ = {e1, e2, e3}, PE′ clearly
describes causal alternatives: you either stay and read, or you stay and cook, or
you go and win, or you go and lose. Given one alternative, you can tell a causal
story of how another alternative might have occurred. Note that PE′ cannot be
derived from any consistent set of transitions directly, but only via fine graining.
Our formal definition runs as follows:
Definition 16 (Fine graining) Let E and E′ be finite sets of finitely splitting point
events. The probability space PE′ is a fine-grained version of PE iff (i) E ⊆ E′,
(ii) for all e′ ∈ E′ − E there is e ∈ E such that e < e′, and (iii) for all S ∈ AE ,
the measure is preserved: µE(S) = µE′(SE′).
Thus, fine graining means adding new initials that are not new minima, while pre-
serving the measure as far as possible. We can now formulate a Lemma that con-
nects the notion of a causal probability space with the notion of fine graining.
Lemma 7 Let E be a set of point events. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. PE is a causal probability space (i.e., the minima of E are consistent).
2. The minima of E are pairwise space-like related.
9The definition is limited to the finite case in view of the general finiteness requirement in this
paper.
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3. PE is a fine-grained version of a causal probability space PT , where T is a
consistent set of transitions.
Proof: 1⇒ 2: Since the set of minima is consistent, there is a history h containing
them all. Two minima e1 and e2, e1 6= e2, cannot be comparable (for then one
would not be minimal), so (as witnessed by h) they are space-like related.
2⇒ 3: Let M be the set of minima of E. For each ei ∈M , select an outcome
Hi ∈ Πei , and let T = {ei  Hi}. By Lemma 3 (3d), T is consistent. Then PE
is derived by fine graining from PT : (i) M ⊆ E and (ii) E −M contains just the
non-minimal elements of E. The measure can be adjusted as necessary.
3 ⇒ 1: Let PE be derived from PT by fine graining, and let M be the set of
minima from among the initials of T . By consistency of T , M is consistent, and
by the definition of fine graining, M is also the set of minima of E. 
3.2.5 Random variables and correlations
In standard probability theory, a random variable X is a function defined on the
sample space A of a probability space P . Usually, but not necessarily, the values
of X will be real numbers. E.g., with the sample space A being the outcomes
of a roll of a die, X might be equal to one for the odd outcomes and equal to
zero for the even ones. The probability of a value x of the random variable X
is written pr(X = x). For a fair die, in the example case we would thus have
pr(X = 1) = 1/2.
Random variables may map more than one element of the sample space to the
same value, as in the example. The most fine-grained random variables preserve
the structure of the sample space via an isomorphism, e.g., X(a) = a. For such
random variables, we may identify pr(X = x) with µ(x). This identification is
unproblematic in the finite case considered here. Random variables are required to
give a definition of correlation and (probabilistic) independence:
Definition 17 (Independence and correlations) A family X1, . . . , Xn of random
variables defined on a probability space P is called independent iff for any n-tuple
〈x1, . . . , xn〉 of respective outcomes,
pr(X1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧Xn = xn) = pr(X1 = x1) · . . . · pr(Xn = xn).
If the family X1, . . . , Xn is not independent, it is called correlated. Thus, a corre-
lation is of the form
pr(X1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧Xn = xn) 6= pr(X1 = x1) · . . . · pr(Xn = xn).
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Note that pairwise independence does not guarantee independence. — It is straight-
forward to transfer these notions to causal probability structures: A random vari-
able XE is again taken to be a function defined on the sample space AE of a
probability space PE . Basic random variables are defined on the sample space
A{t} generated by a single basic transition t = e H .
As an example, consider rolling a fair die again, as described by a probability
space PE (E = {e}). The random variable X will be as defined above. Let Y be
defined to have the value one for outcome 2 and value zero otherwise. It turns out
that X and Y are correlated, since, e.g.,
pr(X = 1 ∧ Y = 1) = 0 6= pr(X = 1) · pr(Y = 1) = (1/2) · (1/6).
Such trivial correlations must be distinguished from empirically challenging corre-
lations, for which the notion of screening-off is important. Before we move to that
discussion, we give a definition of independence and correlations for causal prob-
ability spaces, which is based on using the most fine-grained random variables:
Definition 18 Let PE be a finite causal probability space. PE is called (proba-
bilistically) independent iff for any T = {t1, . . . , tn} ∈ AE ,
µE(T ) =
∏
ti∈T
µ{ti}(ti).
PE is called correlated iff it is not independent.
Thus, we have at our hands two different concepts of correlations: One is about
random variables defined on PE , while the other is about PE itself. The die exam-
ple already shows that on an uncorrelated PE , one can define correlated random
variables. In many empirically important cases, such correlations among random
variables may be explained by uncorrelated PE , invoking the notion of (probabilis-
tic) screening-off.
3.2.6 Screening-off
One of the most important links between causality and probability is via the con-
cept of screening-off. Roughly, screening-off means that if there are correlations
among causally unconnected variables, then in the common past of these vari-
ables there is an event that screens off the correlations, i.e., conditional on which
there are no correlations any more. Consider the notorious barometer example: A
falling barometer is correlated with rain, even though neither does the rain cause
the barometer to fall, nor does the falling barometer cause the rain. In this situa-
tion, we can point to a temporally prior common cause of the correlations: Low
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atmospheric pressure causes both the rain and the barometer’s falling; conditional
on low atmospheric pressure, the two variables are uncorrelated.
This story is good as far as it goes, and it captures a methodologically important
point that may drive empirical research: Explain correlations through the common
past.10 Since we wish to give a reading of screening-off in the framework of this
paper, we need to be more explicit with respect to a number of key notions:
1. What are the variables that may be correlated?
2. For which correlations do we expect screening-off?
3. Which notion of location for variables is appropriate?
4. What does the screening-off principle look like? How can the requirement
of causal priority and the concept of conditioning on a common cause be
expressed?
(1) It seems natural to take “variables” to be random variables defined on a causal
probability space PE . Thus, we will be dealing with correlations in the sense of
Definition 17.
(2) As a famous slogan would have it, correlations cry out for explanation. That
may be so, but certainly not all correlations cry for explanations of the screening-
off variety. That is already obvious from the die example, where the random vari-
ables were just defined so as to yield correlations. Furthermore, any sort of causal
influence of one variable on another will make correlations relatively uninterest-
ing, too. E.g., in the races example from section 3.1.3, going is correlated with
winning, but this is just so because in order to win, one has to go and bet in the
first place. Thus, interesting correlations are among “causally separated” variables,
which must somehow be expressed via the concept of space-like separation, bring-
ing us to the next point.
(3) Random variables do not have locations. Still, for a random variable X defined
in PE , some points e ∈ E may be important for determining the value of X , while
others may be unimportant. The maximal elements of E play a special role here,
since the outcomes of the maximal elements determine an element of the sample
space (the domain of X) uniquely. Letting EM be the set of maximal elements of
E, we thus define the set VX of value-determining points for X to be
VX = {e ∈ EM | ∃t, t′ ∈ [e]∃S ∈ AE (t ∈ S ∧X(S) 6= X((S − {t}) ∪ {t′}))}.
10In fact, the first overt application of a screening-off principle, by Reichenbach (1956), was in
trying to define the direction of time.
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In words, a maximal point e of E is value-determining for X if the outcome of e
can make a difference as to the value of X .
We may now define when two random variables defined in PE are causally
separated:
Definition 19 (Causal separation of random variables) The random variablesX
and Y defined in PE are causally separated iff their respective value-determining
points are either space-like separated or incompatible, i.e., iff
∀eX ∈ VX ∀eY ∈ VY (eX SLR ey ∨ eX , eY incompatible).
Thus, we will be looking for screening-off for causally separated variables only.
(This excludes both the die case and the races example.)
(4) LetX and Y be two causally separated, correlated random variables defined in a
causal probability space PE . If PE itself is correlated (according to Definition 18),
then correlations among variables are to be expected anyhow. However, in the
absence of correlations in PE , a screening-off principle holds. We state this as a
Theorem:
Theorem 1 (Screening-off principle)
Let X and Y be two causally separated, correlated random variables defined in a
causal probability space PE , and let E′ = E − EM be the set of non-maximal
elements in E. Then either (i) PE is correlated or (ii) PE is uncorrelated, and any
S′ ∈ AE′ screens off X from Y : For any S′ ∈ AE′ , any x ∈ ran(X) and any
y ∈ ran(Y ),
pr(X = x ∧ Y = y | S′) = pr(X = x | S′) · pr(Y = y | S′).
Proof: We need to consider (ii) only. For simplicity’s sake we assume that VX ∪
VY = EM , i.e., all maximal points in E are relevant for X or for Y . (Otherwise,
the unnecessary points may be deleted.) We write Sx(S′) for the set {S ∈ AE |
S′ ⊆ S,X(S) = x}, Sy analogously, and Sxy for {S ∈ AE | S′ ⊆ S,X(S) =
x ∧ Y (S) = y}. Thus, e.g., Sx(S′) pools together all ways of continuing S′ such
as to yield value x for X . Then we have
pr(X = x ∧ Y = y | S′) = µE({S ∈ Sxy(S′)})/µE′(S′)
=
∑
S∈Sxy(S′)
µE(S)/µE′(S′)
=
∑
S∈Sxy(S′)
∏
t∈S−S′
µ{t}(t).
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The fraction may be replaced by the product in the last step sincePE is uncorrelated
and thus, both µE(S) and µE′(S′) factor: e.g., µE(S) =
∏
t∈S µ{t}(t). We now
write Tx(S′) for the set of sets of transitions T with initials from VX for which
there is S ∈ AE , S′ ⊆ S, T ⊆ S, with X(S) = x. Thus, Tx(S′) pools together
all possible ways for the variable X to have value x, given that S′ occurred. (The
outcomes of e ∈ VY do not change the value of X .) We thus get
pr(X = x | S′) = µE({S ∈ Sx(S′)})/µE′(S′)
=
∑
S∈Sx(S′)
µE(S)/µE′(S′)
=
∑
S∈Sx(S′)
∏
t∈S−S′
µ{t}(t)
=
∑
T∈Tx(S′)
∏
t∈T
µ{t}(t).
The last step is licensed since for e 6∈ VX , all outcomes of e will lead to the
same value of X by definition, so that the sum is over all outcomes of e, yielding
probability one and thus canceling e from the sum.
We finally have
pr(X = x | S′) · pr(Y = y | S′) = ∑
T∈Tx(S′)
∏
t∈T
µ{t}(t)
 ·
 ∑
T ′∈Ty(S′)
∏
t′∈T ′
µ{t′}(t′)
 =
∑
T∈Tx(S′)
∑
T ′∈Ty(S′)
∏
t∈T
µ{t}(t) ·
∏
t′∈T ′
µ{t′}(t′) =
∑
S∈Sxy(S′)
∏
t∈S−S′
µ{t}(t) = pr(X = x ∧ Y = y | S′).
In the last step, we have employed the assumption that VX and VY together make
up the set of maxima of E, so that any continuation of S′ in AE has “new” initials
either from VX or from VY . 
Thus, our framework allows to capture in a mathematically precise way a notion
of “prior screening-off” for correlated random variables: If variables X and Y
are causally separated and the causal probability space PE on which X and Y are
defined is uncorrelated, then the non-maximal elements of E collectively act as
screeners-off. Even though random variables do not have a space-time location,
the Theorem captures the notion of prior screening-off, since the value of X and
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Y is determined by the maximal elements of E, which are causally later than the
screeners-off.
Reichenbach seems to have thought that screening-off was a universal princi-
ple. Our Theorem, however, allows for a failure of screening-off, viz., if PE itself
is correlated. Correlations in PE may in turn have two very different reasons: (i)
It may be that PE is inadequate to describe the situation at hand, since it contains
correlations where a more careful analysis, extending PE , would find none. PE
may thus be thought of as a “surface model” for the phenomena. In an extended
model (made up from copies of PE after identifying prior screeners-off), there will
be no correlations. (ii) It may be that PE is the right model, and still there are
correlations.
A universal principle of screening-off will not rule out possibility (i). In fact,
the principle of screening-off, read as a piece of scientific methodology, urges us to
replace situations of type (i) with a more satisfactory, uncorrelated extended model.
However, universal screening-off speaks against possibility (ii). It is an empirical
question whether a situation of type (ii) actually occurs. Here, the Bell inequal-
ities together with empirical results of quantum correlation experiments strongly
suggest a positive answer: In nature, there are correlations among causally sepa-
rated variables for which there is no screener-off.11 In the light of the strangeness
of these correlations, it seems appropriate to call correlations in PE “probabilistic
funny business”. Thus, we define:
Definition 20 A causal probability space PE exhibits probabilistic funny business
iff it is correlated according to Definition 18.
A short comment on the theory of Bayesian Networks may be in order. While this
paper is about deducing probabilistic consequences from causal relations, it is often
important to deduce causal relations from statistical data. Since the 1980s, a num-
ber of methods have been developed for elucidating that direction of the problem.
The framework of Bayesian Networks (Pearl, 2000; Jensen, 2001) has been espe-
cially prominent in this respect, and many important applications have been based
on that framework. The present framework may be seen as giving a spatiotempo-
rally and mathematically precise reading of the “causal variables” of the Bayesian
Network theory in terms of random variables defined on causal probability spaces.
It seems plausible to assume that the further development of the present framework
11The Bell inequalities were derived by John Bell after Reichenbach’s death; cf. Bell (1987) for
the original papers dating from 1964 onward. Decisive experiments have been conducted since the
1980s; cf., e.g., Aspect et al. (1982). — A more thorough analysis of the quantum mechanical case
will have to be deferred to a future paper.
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will shed light on fundamental questions in the theory of Bayesian Networks, such
as the question of the status of the “causal Markov condition” assumed there.12
In the following section we will put many of our notions to work.
3.3 Application: Probability of suprema of a chain
As an application of our framework, we consider the following problem:
Let I be an initial chain and Sup := {suph(I) | h ∈ H[I]} the family of its
suprema. This is a kind of chance set-up that Belnap (1992) has called “indeter-
minism without choice”: the transition from I to its suprema is generally indeter-
ministic, but no choice in I determines the outcome. With respect to this set-up,
two questions arise:
1. In which probability space may we describe all the transitions I  p, p ∈
Sup, as causal alternatives?
2. What will be the sum of the probabilities of all these alternative transitions?
Will our framework yield the expected answer,∑
p∈Sup
µ(I  p) = 1?
It turns out that we need a further Postulate to deal with this problem. Appendix A
shows that that Postulate, due to Weiner (1997), is not a consequence of the other
Postulates of branching space-times.
Postulate 4 (Weiner) Suprema retain their order across histories: If I and J are
two initial chains and h1, h2 two histories both containing both I and J , then (i)
suph1(I) = suph1(J) iff suph2(I) = suph2(J), (ii) suph1(I) < suph1(J) iff
suph2(I) < suph2(J), and (iii) suph1(I) > suph1(J) iff suph2(I) > suph2(J).
Given this Postulate, the answer to the two questions is: (1) There is a natural
choice for the sought-for probability space. (2) The probabilities in that space do
sum to one. We formulate this as a Theorem. At present, since the considerations of
probability spaces were limited to the finite case, we will have to assume finiteness
here, too.
12A further interesting link between the two frameworks is given by the problem of applying the
Bayesian Networks approach to single cases; cf. Pearl (2000, chap. 10) on the problem of “the actual
cause”.
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Theorem 2
Let I be an initial chain, and let Sup := {suph(I) | h ∈ H[I]} be the family of
its suprema. Let CC = ∪p∈Supcc(I  p). Then, assuming that CC is finite and
with finitely splitting initials,
1. PCC is a causal probability space,
2. ACC = {cc(I  p) | p ∈ Sup}, and
3. for any measure µCC on FCC ,
∑
p∈Sup µCC(I  p) = 1.
Proof: Let I and Sup be given, and let PCL = ∪p∈Suppcl(I  p), CC =
∪p∈Supcc(I  p). We prove the three claims in turn, spending most of our labor
on (2). First we need to prove a Lemma:
Lemma 8 Let ei be minimal in PCL, and let pj ∈ Sup. Then ei < pj .
Proof: As ei ∈ PCL, there is pi ∈ Sup s.t. ei < pi. Assume that ei 6< pj . In
that case, it follows from Postulate 4 that no history can contain both ei and pj (use
{ei} and I as initials and two histories both containing ei and one containing pi, the
other pj). Thus, on the assumption that ei 6< pj , for a history hi containing ei and a
history hj containing pj , the prior choice principle gives a splitting point e ∈ hi∩hj
s.t. e < ei. But then e < pi, and as pj ∈ hj , hj ∈ H[I], and hj ⊥e H〈pi〉 by
transitivity of undividedness. Thus, e ∈ pcl(I  pi), contradicting the minimality
of ei. 
We now proceed to prove the Theorem.
(1) If PCL has only one minimum, there is nothing to show. So let e1 and e2,
e1 6= e2, be minima of PCL. Let p ∈ Sup. By Lemma 8, e1 < p and e2 < p,
so there is a history containing both. Since e1 and e2, being minima, must be
incomparable, it follows that they are space-like related. The claim then follows
by Lemma 7 (2). 
(2) “⊆”: For each transition I  p, p ∈ Sup, cc(I  p) is a maximally consistent
subset of CC.
Let p ∈ Sup, and let T = cc(I  p). By Lemma 1, T is consistent, and
T ⊂ CC by construction of CC. We need to show that T is maximally consistent
in CC. So let t′ = e′  H ′ ∈ CC − T , and let T ′ = T ∪ {t′}. Since t′ ∈ CC,
t′ ∈ cc(I  p′) for some p′ ∈ Sup, p′ 6= p, and H ′ = Πe′〈p′〉. We will show that
T ′ is inconsistent.
We first show that on the assumption that T ′ is consistent, e′ < p: Assume
that there is no history containing both e′ and p. Then there must be a splitting
point e′′ < e′, and as in the proof of Lemma 8, we get e′′ ∈ pcl(I  p), so
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e′′  Πe′′〈p〉 ∈ T . But as e′′ is a splitting point for H(e′) and H〈p〉), Πe′′〈p〉 ∩
H(e′) = ∅, so that T ′ would be inconsistent. Thus there is a history containing both
e′ and p, and by Postulate 4, e′ < p. — Now again as in the proof of Lemma 8,
e′ ∈ pcl(I  p), and thus either t′ ∈ T , contradicting our assumption t′ 6∈ T , or
T ′ is inconsistent by Lemma 3 (3). 
(2) “⊇”: Each maximally consistent subset of CC is the set of causae causantes
of a transition I  p, p ∈ Sup. We show (a) each consistent subset of CC
determines a supremum of I , (b) each maximally consistent subset of CC does
so uniquely, and (c) a maximally consistent subset of CC is in fact equal to the
corresponding set of causae causantes.
(a) Let S be a consistent subset of CC, let Sm be the set of transitions maximal
in S (which exists by finiteness). We show that there is a history in ∩ti∈SmHi that
contains I:
(a.i) For ti ∈ Sm, all ei are pairwise space-like related (by maximality) and
belong to one history (Lemma 3 (2)).
(a.ii) Also, for each ei there is a point e ∈ I s.t. for all e′ ∈ I , if e′ ≥ e, then
e′ SLR ei: (α) ei is a past cause-like locus for some transition I  p, p ∈ Sup. So
ei < p, and there is a history h such that ei and I belong to h and for hp ∈ H〈p〉,
h ⊥ei hp. (β) For all e ∈ I , ei 6< e. Assume otherwise. Then e ∈ h (since I ⊆ h).
Select hp ∈ H〈p〉. Since I < p, e < p, so e ∈ hp. But ei < e now gives h ≡ei hp,
contradicting hp ∈ H〈p〉. (γ) There is e ∈ I such that ei 6≥ e. Otherwise, ei is an
upper bound for I , and ei ∈ h, so ei ≥ p′ = suph(I). But for p ∈ Sup we also
had p < ei. By Postulate 4 (using I and {ei}), this is impossible. So e SLR ei. (δ)
For e′ ∈ I , if e < e′, then also e′ SLR ei — otherwise, e < e′ ≤ ei, contradicting
(γ).
(a.iii) Since Sm is finite, the intersection of the final sections of I constructed
in step (a.ii) is nonempty, call it I ′. We have established {ei | ti ∈ Sm} SLR I ′.
(a.iv) At this point we may use Postulate 1 for the primary outcome ∩ti∈SmHi
of the set {ei | ti ∈ Sm} and for some primary outcome of I ′, this will give us
a joint outcome and thus a history h containing I ′ (and thus, I) and contained in
all the outcomes Hi of ti ∈ Sm. — Since Sm was maximal, h ∈ ∩ti∈SHi. So S
determines the transition I  suph(I).
(b) Now let S be maximally consistent, and let h1, h2 ∈ ∩ti∈SHi with I ⊆ h1
and I ⊆ h2. Set pi = suphi(I), i = 1, 2. We want to show p1 = p2. Assume
p1 6= p2. (i) By the prior choice principle, since p1 ∈ h1 − h2, there is a choice
point e < p1 such that h1 ⊥e h2 (i.e., e is maximal in h1 ∩ h2). By transitivity
of undividedness, h1 ⊥e H〈p2〉. So e ∈ pcl(I  p2). (ii) The transition t =
e  Πe〈p2〉 is a causa causans for p2, so t ∈ CC. But t 6∈ S, since t rules out
h1 (h1 6∈ Πe〈p2〉), and we had h1 ∈ ∩ti∈SHi. (iii) Since also h2 ∈ ∩ti∈SHi and
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h2 ∈ Πe〈p2〉, the set S ∪ {t} is consistent. This contradicts the assumption that S
is maximally consistent in CC.
(c) Let S ⊆ CC be maximally consistent, and let p ∈ Sup be the uniquely
determined supremum of I for which H〈p〉 ∩
⋂
ti∈S Hi 6= ∅. We now show that
S = cc(I  p).
(c) “⊆”: Let ti = ei  Hi ∈ S. We have ei < p, and as ei ∈ PCL, we also
have ei ∈ pcl(I  p), and as Hi = Πei〈p〉, in fact ti ∈ cc(I  p).
(c) “⊇”: Let ti = ei  Hi 6∈ S. Then S ∪ {ti} must be inconsistent (since S
is maximally consistent), and thus it cannot be that there is hp ∈ H〈p〉 ∩ Hi (else
that history would witness consistency). But then ti 6∈ cc(I  p). 
(3) The last part of the proof is simple: Since ACC = {cc(I  p) | p ∈ Sup}, the
sum in question turns out to be the measure of the unit element 1CC , equal to one
for any measure µCC . In detail:∑
p∈Sup
µ(I  p) =
∑
p∈Sup
µCC(cc(I  p)) =
∑
T∈ACC
µCC(T )
= µCC(∪T∈ACCT )
= µCC(1CC) = 1.

A Preservation of the ordering of suprema
In the proof of Theorem 2 we had to invoke Postulate 4, which says that the order-
ing of history-relative suprema is preserved across histories. Here we will show that
Postulate 4 is not a consequence of the other Postulates of branching space-times.
In the following section we will then show that Postulate 4 is a consequence of
branching space-times theory augmented by a notion of “same space-time point”.13
We will construct a model with two histories, h1 and h2. Let 〈R2,≤M 〉 be the
two-dimensional Minkowskian plane, i.e., the set of points in the two-dimensional
real plane with the Minkowskian ordering,
(x, y) ≤M (x′, y′) iff (x− x′)2 ≤ (y − y′)2 and y ≤ y′.
This will be our first history, h1. In order to have branching and thus, a second
history, we add the set
F = {(∗, y) | y > 0},
13The formulation of Postulate 4 is due originally to Weiner (1997). He also gave a rather simple
model showing that the Postulate is not a consequence of branching space-times alone (Weiner,
personal communication). The model presented here was derived independently. It emphasizes the
fact that histories in a branching space-times model may be radically non-isomorphic.
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h1 h2
I J I J(0,0)(0,0)
(-1,1) (1,1) (*,1)
Figure 3: A branching space-times model violating Postulate 4. See text for details.
which is isomorphic to the positive reals. We now define the ordering ≤ on W =
R2 ∪ F to be
(x, y) ≤ (x′, y′) iff (x, y) ≤M (x′, y′)
(∗, y) ≤ (∗, y′) iff y ≤ y′
(x, y) < (∗, y′) iff (x, y) <M (−y′, y′) or (x, y) <M (y′, y′).
Thus, for no (x, y) and (∗, y′) do we have (∗, y′) ≤ (x, y). In this way, F is pasted
into the future light cone above (0, 0). Through the ordering, (∗, y) is in some sense
identified with the two points (−y, y) and (y, y) that are on the border of the future
light cone above (0, 0). The resulting model is 〈W,≤〉, pictured in Figure 3. We
need to establish that this is a model of branching space-times. Clearly, W 6= ∅.
Fact: The ordering is antisymmetric.
Proof: Since this is clear for the ordering on R2 and on F , we only need to look at
the “mixed” case. But if (x, y) < (∗, y′), it cannot be that (∗, y′) < (x, y), by the
definition of the ordering. 
Fact: The ordering is transitive.
Proof: Select a, b, c ∈ W such that a < b, b < c. If all the three points are in
R2 or all in F , then a < c follows immediately from transitivity of the respective
orderings. So we only need to check two cases: (i) a = (x, y), b = (x′, y′), c =
(∗, y′′). Assume that b < c is due to the fact that (x′, y′) <M (y′′, y′′) (for −y′′,
argue analogously). Then a < c follows from the transitivity of the Minkowskian
ordering. (ii) a = (x, y), b = (∗, y′), c = (∗, y′′). Assume that (x, y) < (y′, y′)
holds. Then since y′ < y′′, in the Minkowskian ordering, (y′, y′) <M (y′′, y′′),
and a < c again follows from the transitivity of the Minkowskian ordering. 
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Fact: Let a = (x, y) >M (0, 0), b = (∗, y′). Then a and b are incomparable.
Proof: By the definition of the ordering. 
Fact: In 〈W,≤〉 there are exactly two histories.
Proof: h1 = R2 is a history, since it is upward directed, and by the previous fact, it
cannot be extended by elements of F . The set
h2 = (h1 − {(x, y) | (0, 0) <M (x, y)}) ∪ F
is also upward directed, and cannot be extended by elements of {(x, y) | (0, 0) <M
(x, y)} either. Again by the previous fact, “mixed” cases are excluded. 
Fact: The ordering is dense and has infima and history-relative suprema.
Proof: From the properties of the orderings on R2 and on F . 
Fact: The prior choice principle holds. There is exactly one splitting point, (0, 0).
Proof: Let c1 be a chain in h1 − h2, i.e., in the future light cone of (0, 0). Then
(0, 0) < c1, and (0, 0) is maximal in h1 ∩ h2. Alternatively, let c2 be a chain in
h2 − h1. Again (0, 0) < c2, since (0, 0) < (∗, y) for all y > 0. 
We have thus established that 〈W,≤〉 is a model of branching space-times, re-
specting the Postulates (cf. Belnap 2002). We now prove that 〈W,≤〉 violates
Postulate 4.
Fact: In W , there are two initial chains I, J that have different suprema in h1, but
the same supremum in h2.
Proof: Let I = {(1, 1− 1/n) | n ∈ N}, J = {(−1, 1− 1/n) | n ∈ N}, as shown
in Figure 3. These chains are in h1∩h2, and they are bounded — e.g., by (1, 1) and
(−1, 1), resp., which are their suprema in h1. In h2, however, suph2(I) = (∗, 1) =
suph2(J). — Along the same lines, one can construct suprema that are space-like
related in h1, but comparable in h2 (e.g., set I ′ = {(2, 2− 1/n) | n ∈ N}). 
B Branching space-times with space-time points
If we have available a notion of “the same spacetime point” in a model of branching
space-times, then Postulate 4 holds. We define the notion of “same space-time
point” as follows:
Definition 21 (Branching space-times with spacetime points) A triple 〈W,≤,S〉
is a model of branching space-times with spacetime points (BST+S) iff 〈W,≤〉 is
a model of branching space-times and S is an equivalence relation on W such that
1. For each history h in W and for each equivalence class [s], s ∈ W , the
intersection h ∩ [s] contains exactly one element.
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2. S respects the ordering, i.e., for [s], [s′] equivalence classes and h1, h2 his-
tories, [s]∩h1 = [s′]∩h1 iff [s]∩h2 = [s′]∩h2, and the same for “<” and
for “>”.
In BST+S we can prove that history-relative suprema of initial chains, guaranteed
to exist by BST, are at the same location.
Lemma 9 Let 〈W,≤,S〉 be a model of BST+S, let I be an upper bounded chain in
W , and let h1, h2 be two histories with I ⊆ h1 ∩h2. Then S(suph1(I), suph2(I)).
Proof: Let s1 = suph1(I), and let s2 = [s1] ∩ h2 be the spacetime point in h2 that
is at the same position as s1 according to S. We need to prove that s2 = suph2(I).
First, s2 is an upper bound for I: Take e ∈ I . Since e ≤ s1 and S preserves order
and e ∈ h1 ∩ h2, we have e < s2. It remains to prove that s2 is the smallest upper
bound for I in h2. Assume otherwise. Then there has to be s′2 ∈ h2, s′2 < s2,
and s′2 an upper bound for I . By the argument just given, s′1 = [s′2] ∩ h1 is an
upper bound for I in h1, and from order preservation, s′1 < s1. This contradicts
the assumption that s1 is the supremum (least upper bound) of I in h1. Thus,
s2 = suph2(I): the supremum of I is at the same spacetime point across histories.

As a corollary, we get that a model of BST+S satisfies Postulate 4.
Corollary 1 In a model of BST+S, Postulate 4 is satisfied
Proof: Let I, J be two initial chains, and let h1, h2 be two histories two which both
I and J belong. Then by Lemma 9, the history-relative suprema will be at the same
spacetime points, and the claim follows by order preservation of S. 
With the model of Appendix A we have established the following:
Fact: Not every model of BST can be extended to a model of BST+S.
Proof: By the model from Appendix A and by corollary 1, using contraposition. 
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